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Abstract
Internet of things (IoT) is a disruptive paradigm with wide ranging applications including healthcare, manufacturing,
transportation and retail. Within healthcare, smart connected wearable devices are widely used to achieve improved
wellbeing, quality of life and security of citizens. Such connected devices generate significant amount of data containing
sensitive information about patient requiring adequate protection and privacy assurance. Unauthorized access to an
individual’s private data constitutes a breach of privacy leading to catastrophic outcomes for an individuals personal
and professional life. Furthermore, breach of privacy may also lead to financial loss to the governing body such as those
proposed as part of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe. Furthermore, while mobility afforded
by smart devices enables ease of monitoring, portability and pervasive processing, it also introduces challenges with
respect to scalability, reliability and context-awareness for its applications. This paper is focused on privacy preservation
within smart context-aware healthcare with a special emphasis on privacy assurance challenges within the Electronic
Transfer of Prescription (ETP). To this extent, we present a case for a comprehensive, coherent, and dynamic privacy-
preserving system for smart healthcare to protect sensitive user data. Based on a thorough analysis of existing privacy
preservation models we propose an enhancement for the widely used Salford model to achieve privacy preservation against
masquerading and impersonation threats. The proposed model therefore improves privacy assurance for cutting edge
IoT applications such as smart healthcare whilst addressing unique challenges with respect to context-aware mobility of
such applications.
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1. Introduction
Internet of things (IoT) is a disruptive paradigm with
applications across diverse domains including healthcare,
manufacturing, transportation and retail. The smart med-
ical devices market is expected to reach revenue of $25 bil-
lion revenue by the year 2025 with such smart connected
wearable devices envisaged to be widely used to achieve
improved wellbeing, quality of life and security of citizens.
In addition to their ability to support real-time continu-
ous monitoring of patients’ vital signs, such devices also
enable context-aware mobility vital to improving overall
quality of medical care provided such as those illustrated
by Bhattacharyya et al.[1].
Smart interconnected devices generate large amount of
data that is used for analysis and improved recommenda-
tions to the patients and overall healthcare system. How-
ever, this data represents patient behaviour and includes
medical history and therefore requires adequate protection
and privacy assurances. Within this context, healthcare
data refers to any health-related information that is rele-
vant for making the decision about the individual’s health.
The collected data can be used for prevention, treatment,
cure, health promotion, self-care, and wider public health
activities. This data provides an insight into an individu-
als wellbeing, can affect treatment procedures, and helps
study emerging trends in diseases and to modify treatment
protocols [2, 3, 4].
There are different sources for healthcare data such as
administrative data, patient medical record (PMR), pa-
tient surveys and the standardized clinical data [5]. The
electronic patient records include a number of patient re-
lated information, such as physicians notes, patient com-
ments, and questions, clinical trials, patient surveys etc.
Specialist doctors, physicians, nurses, patients, can all have
access to this record over the Internet. With the dig-
itization of all these data records, the volume, variety,
and veracity of the healthcare data have increased, mak-
ing it complex and diverse, therefore requiring emerging
paradigms such as Big Data to facilitate the efficient pro-
cessing to extract useful knowledge [6, 7].
However, the digitization and outsourcing of data to com-
puting rich organizations make it accessible to wider user
domains, on-demand with minimal effort. Such patterns of
data accessibility introduce new challenges with respect to
security and privacy due to the sensitive and confidential
nature of the personal data [8, 9, 10, 11]. Furthermore,
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while mobility afforded by smart devices enables ease of
monitoring, portability and pervasive processing, it also
introduces challenges with respect to scalability, reliabil-
ity and context-awareness for its applications.
The European Union has introduced a General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [12] regulation for man-
dating organizations to implement data protection mea-
sures. The compliance of GDPR regulations has brought
an added emphasis to the protection of security and pri-
vacy, especially for the personal data. Various measures
have been adopted for protecting personal data of indi-
viduals from the misuse. These include data anonymiza-
tion [13, 14, 15] i.e. anonamyzing the individual’s per-
sonal information and sensitive fields, or using the crypto-
graphic tools [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] to protect the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and privacy of individual data. Fur-
thermore, authentication mechanisms are also deployed
to verify the identity of a user attempting to access the
data. These include password and certificate-based sys-
tems, biometric-based access system and multi-factor au-
thentication [23, 24]. A Salford model is used along with
the paper prescriptions and barcodes so that the patient
should still avail the health services in the event of net-
work or service failure [25]. Since health care workers are
involved in different roles and responsibilities, their ac-
cess to the system can be based on their job description
[26, 27, 28].
In this paper, we performed a comprehensive study on
the security and privacy challenges related to the electronic
healthcare data with the patient portals. In particular, we
discuss real-life healthcare scenarios i.e. Electronic Pre-
scription Transfer [29], access to a patient personal data
in an emergency and the use of mobile technologies to
access the healthcare data [30, 31]. Further, we analyze
the potential security and privacy properties of the exist-
ing systems and propose an enhanced version of the Sal-
ford model to improve the security and privacy properties.
The enhanced model does not increase the complexity of
the system and does not incur additional computational
and system resources. Additionally, we analyzed the se-
curity and privacy properties of the enhanced model with
the state of the art solutions and provide recommendations
on involving patient with specific attention to consent and
approval due to the sensitivity of the data involved.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a discussion of the primary sources of healthcare
data. Section 3 identifies security concerns related to dif-
ferent healthcare data sources. Section 4 presents an in-
depth analysis of the factors affecting security and privacy
in healthcare applications followed by an analysis of the
unique challenges within these applications in section 5.
Current security and privacy measures are presented in
section 6. Section 7 discusses potential scenarios within
healthcare applications and proposed improvement for the
Salford model in Section 8. Section 9 discusses future rec-
ommendations. Section 10 concludes the paper with a
discussion on open challenges to improve the security and
privacy of healthcare data.
2. Healthcare Data Sources
Healthcare sector is diverse and multidimensional in-
volving entities such as patients, doctors, lab technicians,
administrative staff, health centers, insurance companies,
and pharmacies. These entities interact with each other
generating unique but interrelated data. This section fo-
cuses on the major sources of healthcare data.
2.1. Administrative data
Any interaction between a person and healthcare sys-
tem produces data categorized as administrative data. These
interactions include but are not limited to visiting a Gen-
eral Practitioner (GP), diagnostics reports, medical pre-
scriptions, admission/discharge from a healthcare facility,
referrals to other GPs or specialists and prescribed medi-
cal tests for further analysis. Administrative data are col-
lected through claims, enrollments, procedures, and diag-
nostics tests and is primarily used for administrative and
billing purposes but can be used to study the effects of
procedures, quality of the healthcare services, side effects
of the drugs and costs of healthcare services.
The administrative data can also be used to analyze
pharmacy services, drug utilization and effects, and drug
safety and effectiveness. Research based on administrative
data must be interpreted in the context of changes in drug
availability over time. Introduction of a new drug to the
market and changes to reimbursement criteria or health
coverage can significantly affect drug utilization and pa-
tients classification.
Typical elements of the administrative data are types of
services, units of services utilized, cost of diagnosis, codes
of procedures, location code and amount billed with cur-
rent balance. As these criteria and codes are consistent,
they can be easily accessed and shared globally [32]. Fur-
thermore, as it is primarily used for billing and collec-
tion purposes, it contains limited medical information and
therefore, has limited significance for public reporting.
2.2. Patient health records
A patient health record is a list of medical care and ser-
vices being used by a patient. Over the last two decades,
most of the medical data produced are in a digitized form
which facilitates ease of access, storage, and sharing. Fur-
thermore, it also makes the data convenient and cheaper
to use for healthcare service improvement, quality control
and reporting of healthcare sector progress. Patient health
records typically act as a communication tool and refer-
ence for treatment, long-term care, and management of
chronic medical conditions [33, 34, 35]. The prime benefit
of this source of healthcare data is its richness in clini-
cal data and overall credibility. However, the limitations
of medical record are its complexity and compilation of
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data in different formats retrieved from different health-
care sources. Additionally, since a significant segment of
the data is in paper format, it requires expertise, time and
effort to extract required information.
2.3. Patient surveys
Patient surveys are periodic and are used to gather
strategic information about patient experiences with the
healthcare services. It not only gives an overall picture
of the patient satisfaction with healthcare level of ser-
vices but also gives the progress and direction in which
healthcare system is heading highlighting areas for im-
provement. It includes treatment, medical care and use of
healthcare facilities by the patients and their level of satis-
faction with the quality and effectiveness of the healthcare
services [36, 37]. These surveys are usually administered
through the use of phone, post or Internet-based tools. Pa-
tients satisfaction and overall perception of the healthcare
services are the basis of patient-oriented services since the
ultimate indicator of a healthcare system is patient con-
tentment. Patient surveys are a useful source of healthcare
data as patients are the best source to evaluate the current
condition of the healthcare sector. Results of the surveys
are easier to understand and share as they are provided by
the patients themselves. However, potential shortcomings
of this source of data include the expense, time consump-
tion, and significant impact of the formulation of questions
and sample population size on the results [36].
2.4. Comments from individual patients
Any informal information gathered from or provided by
patients as opposed to carefully designed efforts is termed
as comments from individual patients. This source of health-
care data is becoming increasingly common and gaining
influence as the Internet and social networking sites are
making it easier for individuals to share their expressions,
experiences, and preferences. Therefore, feedback from in-
dividual patients is becoming an increasingly popular in-
gredient regarding the performance of healthcare services,
health plans and healthcare providers especially physicians
[5]. It is a powerful tool as the knowledge available from in-
dividual patient’s feedback is immensely rich as compared
with statistical information.
Furthermore, this source provides patients a platform
to communicate their expressions and feedback. However,
major drawback of this source is its integrity and its sus-
ceptibility to being influenced by emotions. Furthermore,
the results are not impartial as comments are not collected
systematically. Another issue with this source is the fact
that it does not represent the entire patient population as
ratings of a facility, GP or service are random and can be
inconsistent across the patient population.
2.5. Standard clinical data
Standard clinical data represents data reported by fa-
cilities such as nursing home, non-profit organizations in-
volved in vaccination and certain health agencies regarding
the health and treatment given to the patients on a regular
basis. This data provides details of healthcare information
and can be used for quality control, quality assurance and
assessment of the health agencies. This allows for collabo-
rative research, large-scale analytics and sharing of sophis-
ticated tools and methodologies and therefore important
because it ensures traceability of the data and optimized
data flow. Also, these statistical analyses require limited
modifications, minimal oversight, and resource allocation.
It also involves simple mapping algorithms ensuring consis-
tency between Operational Data and Submitted Datasets
[38]. A major limitation of this source is that it may not
address all topics of interest.
3. Security Challenges for Healthcare Data
Healthcare data is diverse and can be categorized into
different types as detailed in section 2. Although differ-
ent types of healthcare data are interrelated, they are
unique and thus have unique security and privacy issues
based on their source and type of information they possess
[39, 40, 41]. In this section, we present a discussion regard-
ing security and privacy challenges for different healthcare
data sources.
3.1. GDPR Regulations and Patients Health Data
The European Union has forced it member countries to
employ the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
on 25 May 2018. The GDPR is the European Unions new
law for ensuring the protection of citizens private data and
is replaces EU existing law i.e. Data Protection Directive,
which has been in effect since 1995. The GDPR regula-
tions imposes wide range of requirements and regulations
on the organizations that used to collect and process per-
sonal data of citizens. These requirements includes trans-
parency, fairness and lawfulness in handling and processing
the personal data of citizens. Furthermore, the law also
limits organizations to process the personal data with the
consent of users and for the legitimate purposes. It also
requires that organization must ensuring the security, in-
tegrity and confidentiality of personal data by imposing a
reasonable security measures. Organizations not employ-
ing the GDPR regulations or not protecting the users data
would face a maximum fine of around 20 million or four
percent of an organizations annual global revenue. In addi-
tion, the GDPR empowers citizen to sue the organizations
in the court of law that breach the GDPR. The patients
health data is considered most sensitive and private data
and require effective security from the insider as well as
from the outsider. It is forbidden to share personal data
of patients without their consent even to employees of the
health organization. To fulfill the GDPR regulations and
effective security of patients data we presented a frame-
work for effective access of data based on the regulations
and rights assigned to employees of the health organiza-
tion.
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3.2. Patient generated health data
Patient-generated health data (PGHD) is health-related
data created, recorded, or gathered by patients to help ad-
dress a specific health concern. PGHD include, but are
not limited to health history, treatment history, biomet-
ric data, symptoms, or lifestyle choices. PGHD helps in
gathering information that helps in improving care qual-
ity, reduced cost, and patients safety. PGHD are different
from other types of healthcare data i.e. patient generates
and collects data and later decides on whom to share the
data with.
With the adoption of big data in the healthcare sector,
a problematic truism is ”More data equals more knowledge
equal better health outcome” [42]. However, the success
of PGHD in the diagnose and treatment is solely based
on the willingness of the patients to share the personal
information with the healthcare providers. This sharing
ultimately depends on the trust and confidence of a pa-
tient in the overall sharing mechanism. With the advent
of the Internet, social media, and ever-increasing means
of data sharing, the whole phenomenon of healthcare data
sharing will be successful only when the elements of pri-
vacy, security, trust, and ownership carefully addressed.
Omnipresent Internet and the abundance of wearable
online devices have opened new horizon of healthcare data
where an enormous amount of real-time data is being gen-
erated, stored, and shared on-demand by means of mobile
applications, and Wifi connectivity. While PGHD pro-
vides number of opportunities, it also introduces many
challenges in the healthcare industry. Under poorly de-
signed privacy and security policies, there is a potential
for exploitation of healthcare data by unlawful sharing and
retrieving of sensitive information.
With ever-growing data sources, there is a need to clar-
ify the role of PGHD in the health industry as well as in
the commercial sector. For instance, National Institute
of Health introduced Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI)
which described as a new way of doing research that fosters
open, responsible data sharing with the highest regard for
participants privacy and that puts engaged participants at
the center of research efforts[43, 44]. This initiative drew
an assumption that in the future, healthcare data will not
produce any harmful unintended consequence for the data
donors. However, it is obvious that we cannot rely on
these assumptions and hope that attacks on privacy will
be managed and data handled with responsibility and care.
Furthermore, it must be noted that although the health-
care data related to clinical environment and PGHD are
fusing, existing rules and regulations are generally only
applicable to the data produced within the boundaries of
the healthcare service providers. Furthermore, data pro-
duced outside the healthcare sector is not yet fully cov-
ered and affected by such regulations. Mobile technol-
ogy enables users to generate large volume of real-time
data. Furthermore, with improved methods of collecting,
processing, and storing large amount of data being devel-
oped, the conception of the healthcare sector and mobile
technologies are evolving. Consequently, it not only con-
veys information but also conveys medical knowledge and
a mean to understand the detail and processes happening
in the real time. However, mobile devices and monitoring
tools generating healthcare data outside the boundaries of
the healthcare sector is not covered within the rules and
regulations in place to protect in-clinic healthcare data.
Furthermore, as remote sensors, monitors and devices
are becoming more common and cheaper, it is becoming
similar and common to use the real-time medical data
to improve the wellbeing of the patients. However, data
breaches, exploitation, and unlawful exposure are creating
a real threat to the adoption and penetration of this trend
in the healthcare services. Security and privacy are grow-
ing concerns which are creating a fear of sharing personal
sensitive data. It has become obvious that these security
and privacy issues must be addressed to allow a smooth
penetration of PGHD in the healthcare industry.
According to [45], the social norms currently being ob-
served in the society where people are becoming increas-
ingly comfortable with sharing personal information and
self-disclosure on the social media sites. Mobile applica-
tion developers and social media sites are assuring users
the safety and privacy of their sensitive data and encour-
aging users to share their sensitive information without
the fear of exploitation. But do they really provide the
security and confidentiality to the users data? With data
breaches and exploitation of online data is common, it is
obvious that not enough is being done and yet more efforts
are required to fully secure online PGHD.
In summary, there is a dilemma in the whole phe-
nomenon of PGHD where we need to share the data freely
to fully benefit from the offerings of the real-time PGHD
data but also this data must be scrutinized to make sure
that only limited and necessary sharing of the data to ad-
dress the privacy and security concerns.
3.3. Clinical data
Clinical data is the most important source of health-
care data. Clinical data is either gathered through the
treatment of patients by the healthcare service providers
or during a planned and controlled clinical trial. Clinical
data can be divided into six major types:
Electronic Health Record: Electronic Health Record
is by far the most abundant form of healthcare data. It is
generated in the healthcare service provider facilities and
usually not available to external research activities. It is a
comprehensive set of healthcare data and includes a list of
attributes such as personal information, age, address, lab
reports, blood and urine tests, X-ray reports, insurance
coverage information, medical condition, and treatment
history.
Administrative data: This type mainly contains data
related to admission and discharge of a patient from a
healthcare facility.
Claims Data: This is mainly for the billing purposes
and contains the insurance related information such as cov-
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erage type, membership detail, and claims history. It can
be obtained from commercial healthcare facilities or gov-
ernment agencies.
Patient Disease Registry: This contains informa-
tion related to chronic deceases and helps understand cur-
rent trends in decease such as diabetes, heart decease, can-
cer, HIV, and asthma. It also helps in identifying any po-
tential outbreak of decease and also uses to manage and
contain any outbreak. Patient/decease registry also helps
in drawing national healthcare drives and planning health
policy of a nation.
Health Survey: Health surveys analyze the overall
health condition of a country and help identify most preva-
lent chronic diseases in a population. It results from na-
tional and local level surveys which help in research and
development activities. This is one of the few healthcare
data types which are primarily used for research purpose.
Clinical Trial Data: Clinical trial data refers to in-
formation collected through publicly and privately sup-
ported clinical studies from around the world. Most of
the healthcare data produced and generated within the
boundaries of a healthcare services provider are consid-
ered as clinical data. It is either collected during an on-
going treatment of patients or as a part of formal clinical
trials. It is by far the most exclusive type of healthcare
data including; administrative and demographic informa-
tion, diagnosis, treatment, prescription drugs, laboratory
tests, physiologic monitoring data, hospitalization, patient
insurance, hospital discharge data, claims data, disease
registries, health surveys, and clinical trial data [46]. As
before, clinical data is of utmost importance when used
to aid diagnosis, analysis and treatment of patients how-
ever digitization of the healthcare data and sharing and
transmission of this sensitive data among healthcare ser-
vices providers introduces the challenges of privacy and
security.
Security and privacy goals are typically patients’ ex-
pectations with the healthcare data and its handling. Ac-
cording to the Good Medical Practices, patients have the
right to expect that their personal information will not
be shared except for the fulfillment of the professional du-
ties of the health services providers and that also with the
consent of the patients. It is the duty of the health ser-
vice providers to share the clinical data only when needed
and only related information is shared and throughout this
process, patient need to be aware of how much and with
whom data has been shared. This is particularly impor-
tant when interpreted within the newly formed regulations
within GDPR.
Additionally, integrity and confidentiality of the health-
care data are also important. Healthcare system handling
all clinical data must be able to protect data against any
unlawful alteration and should be protected against at-
tacks to ensure availability. It is especially challenging to
detect data corruption in an electronic database due to
malicious actors targeting such datasets as well as due to
the untrustworthiness of the communication links used for
data sharing. Guidelines and regulations such as HIPAA
and GDPR do cover clinical data but the integrity of data
cannot be ensured by these regulations alone. A hardened
system capable of defending the healthcare data from ma-
licious attacks and data alteration is required to ensure the
integrity and availability of the information for the lawful
use. Consequently, there is a need for an effective security
policy to ensure authorized access to critical data.
3.4. Pharmacovigilance
Pharmacovigilance is related to data collection, detec-
tion, assessment, and monitoring for the prevention of
risks and adverse effects with pharmaceutical products.
Information received from patients and healthcare service
providers via predefined data sharing agreements and other
resources such as medical literature play a critical role in
providing the data necessary for pharmacovigilance to take
place. It is necessary for most countries to make this data
available to the public before any new drug is introduced
in the public domain. This requirement facilitates iden-
tification of the hazards associated with pharmaceutical
products and to minimize the risk of potential harm to
patient health and wellbeing.
The Pharmacovigilance process involves storing, shar-
ing, and accessing of information and feedbacks by patients
and health service providers to assess the possible adverse
effect of drugs. Pharmacovigilance is a critical part of the
healthcare industry, the outcomes of which directly affect
the well-being of the general public. This process mainly
involves storing, sharing, and accessing appropriate infor-
mation to identify any unwanted or undesirable effect to
minimize the risks. As with any other large data system
involved in electronic data sharing, storing, and transfer-
ring, this phenomenon is also susceptible to confidentiality
and integrity challenges.
Technological advancements and the application of Big
Data in the pharmacovigilance facilitates possibility to
store, transfer and share an enormous amount of data any-
where by increasing the number of patient and healthcare
providers. However, the confidentiality and integrity of
the data becomes an issue as with whom and what type
of data is being shared. Since this data is being shared
between the commercial and health services providers, the
result of any data breach, an unlawful exposure or any
manipulation, will result in adverse health and financial
consequence [47].
4. Factors Affecting Security and Privacy in Health-
care Applications
Different healthcare service providers and data gener-
ated by them is increasingly integrated into big data tech-
nologies. This has expanded privacy and security concerns
for the individuals [41, 48]. Within the big data scenario,
there are several aspects of the healthcare system which
need to be addressed [49]. These are briefly explained as
follow.
5
4.1. Data access and storage
Paper-based healthcare data naturally placed a phys-
ical limit on access, edit and sharing of information. On
the other hand, the electronic form of data removes these
barriers and makes it virtually available to everyone. Al-
though electronic records benefit users and healthcare providers,
there can be significant adverse impact if the information is
used for the purposes other than necessary health-related
service. To minimize the risks associated with the elec-
tronic format of healthcare data, the following challenges
require investigation.
4.2. Data Acquisition and Communication Protection
As discussed in section 2, healthcare data is diverse
and multivariate collected in various formats. Therefore
the data acquisition challenge within this context is two-
fold. Firstly, integrating different data streams to perform
meaningful analytics of data is a challenge in maintaining
quality of the data collected. Furthermore, data originat-
ing from different streams contains potentially diverse se-
curity contexts which require appropriate protection mech-
anisms.
Data ownership represents one of the major chal-
lenges in the healthcare industry. A primary question is Do
patients own their health-related data or it is the property
of healthcare services providers or health insurers? Or it is
a combined ownership? Since data is being shared among
many entities, what implications does this data sharing
has over the authority and ownership when crossing orga-
nizational boundaries? It becomes challenging to ensure
privacy and security of the data when it moves between
different entities with different levels of authorities espe-
cially when taking into account disparate security policies.
Amount and types of data stored Healthcare data
is enormous and versatile as it consists of many types such
as doctors notes, lab reports, MRI, X-rays reports, and
readings of vital organs. With this volume and variety
of data, a challenge is how much of this data should be
stored for diagnostics purposes. In such circumstances,
there is a trade-off between the volume of data used and
the exposure of data to security and privacy breaches as
a higher volume of data can aid improved analysis and
diagnosis however it also increases the risk of potential
data breaches.
Storage location With the increasing volume of data,
it is increasingly difficult to store all of the data at a local
data store leading to a proliferation of remote data storage
solutions such as data clouds. A typical characteristic of
such data storage options is that they are not only located
at different geographical locations but are also owned and
managed by different organizations. These arrangements
introduce concerns such as whether data be stored at the
central location, in the cloud or at the patients premises
in the case of the remote sensor. Depending on where the
data is located and how it is managed, the requirements
of security, access, and authority change dramatically. For
example, security measures for data residing in the data
center of a hospital will be different to the one in an ex-
ternal cloud environment which introduces a number of
authentication and authorization challenges [50]
Access privileges A primary goal of the access con-
trol as a measure to achieve security and privacy for health-
care data is that a person only has access to the required
data which they are entitled to. Within this context, users
can be categorized into several classes to ensure legitimate
access to crucial information. Some users such as doc-
tors and nurses may have a read and write access to the
patients data they are attending to while others such as
health insurers might only need read access to their clients
data. In any case, the principle of least privilege should be
followed when assigning privileges to different user groups.
Patients consent As a significant part of healthcare
data is related to patients i.e. clinical, personal and diag-
nostic data. This introduces a need to engage individuals
who are represented by the data items and therefore to
seek their consent before sharing and processing data. Re-
cent advancements such as the GDPR have brought special
emphasis on personally identifiable data and the need to
have consent from individuals which can impact a security
policy and respective protection mechanisms. However,
there can be situations such as emergency cases where data
of a patient needs to be shared with a party previously not
authorized for sharing. Such circumstances mandate spe-
cial attention and distinct efforts to address them.
4.3. Data analytics
Large-scale healthcare data is required to be analyzed
to extract valuable information. Currently, most of the
data is paper-based but with time it set to be digitized.
Healthcare data analytics are tools used to perform anal-
ysis on the raw healthcare data to detect patterns and
trends. This helps in improved diagnosis as well as help-
ing with measuring the effectiveness and progress of an
ongoing treatment. Clearly, it will help in a higher quality
of the healthcare services and reduced cost. Premier, U.S.
Healthcare Alliance Network has reported that the use of
healthcare analytics helped them save an estimated 29,000
lives and reduction of approximately 7 billion in healthcare
cost [51]. Obviously, access to healthcare data will have
risks. Privacy and security would be a concern accessing
these records as a query might generate unwanted data or
sensitive and secretive data. Safeguards such as an up to
date antivirus, setting up a firewall, encryption of sensi-
tive data and multifactor authentication are required to
protect confidential healthcare data [52]. Auditing mech-
anisms are needed to enable the flow of data yet securing
against any unlawful access. Data anonymization provides
an effective option for privacy however it limits conducting
rigorous analytics of the healthcare data.
4.4. Heterogeneous regulations
Healthcare data is diverse in nature and usually scat-
tered around different healthcare entities. In the case of
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big data, this data can be distributed theoretically any-
where in the globe. Different entities are regulated by
different rules and transfer of data between different enti-
ties with different regulations can be tricky. For example,
patient’s consent for disclosure of data may be compulsory
for some while it is optional for others. When data moves
with health care service providers falling under different
rules and regulations, privacy and security may become
an issue even through legal disclosure of data.
5. Security and Privacy Challenges in Healthcare
Healthcare systems collaborate in nature. This is be-
cause it has number of stakeholders such as physicians,
nurses, lab technicians, and pathologists working together
to maximize the effective use of raw and defined healthcare
data. Each stakeholder generates heterogeneous data such
as physical exams, lab reports, diagnostics notes, clinical
notes, imaging analysis, patients observations and inter-
views, and progress and outcomes of the of therapies and
treatments. The use of latest and emerging technologies,
sensors and sharing techniques, and information and com-
munication techniques make it easier to generate and share
healthcare data but also introduces challenges with respect
to security and privacy. This is because electronic health-
care data is susceptible to unlawful access, compromise
integrity, and unauthorized distribution [53, 54, 55].
Another major challenge with big data applications in
the healthcare sector is complex and distributed nature of
healthcare data, diverse schema and standards, and rapid
growth of new health terminologies and ontologies. The
major challenge here is not the lack of data but the lack
of information to support decision making, planning, and
strategy. Following are some of the issues with the adop-
tion of big data in the healthcare [46]:
5.1. Resistance to change
Healthcare system is traditionally lagging in adoption
of the new technologies compared to the other sectors such
as banking or oil industry. This is because of lack of the
technical administrative support, legislative issues, lack of
trust and slow in changes to the medical practices and lack
of expertise in the ICT.
5.2. Fragmentation of the healthcare data
Healthcare data is fragmented and distributed across
the healthcare system consisting of legacy as well as mod-
ern equipment with limited interoperability capabilities. It
is, therefore, challenging to integrate different data types
due to different schema, formats, and standards.
5.3. Ethical Challenges
Access to complete and comprehensive data related to
a patient in a timely manner is vital to effective diagno-
sis and treatment. However, sharing of information among
many stakeholders become difficult due to ethical issues in-
cluding confidentiality and integrity of the patients data,
control, and extent of access to medical record, ownership,
and governance of the healthcare data and commercializa-
tion of the healthcare data.
5.4. Proliferation of healthcare standards
Standards are agreed upon specifications that allow
different systems, tools, and platforms to work with each
other. Healthcare sector lacks a central single standard for
different sources of health data. Due to different layouts
and formats of diagnostic reports, examinations, drugs,
and decreases, it is challenging to integrate data from dif-
ferent sources and stakeholders into a single entity.
5.5. Rules, laws, and regulatory bodies
Other factors that must be considered while using big
data analytics for healthcare are rules and laws. Health-
care privacy and security not only concern with the expec-
tations but also to norms involving professional practice,
privileges, protected communication, and duty of confiden-
tiality, as well as to data collection, distribution, and re-
tention [56]. In many developed countries, different health
acts not only provide a guidance in handling healthcare
data but also set benchmarks on setting guidelines on how
to whom and to what extent of healthcare data be en-
closed.
5.6. Technological challenges
In todays business environment, a multitude of devices,
users, and enormous traffic all combine to create a prolif-
eration of data. Security and privacy issues are the center
for the optimum use of the big data. Traditional tools to
handle such data is not sufficient and new tools and meth-
ods are required to essentially handle the large volume of
healthcare data. It can be concluded that the list of issues
mentioned above, privacy and security concerns are vital
to the penetration and adoption of big data deployment
in the healthcare sector. Trust in privacy and security of
the healthcare data results in the level of information a
person is willing to share [56]. It is important to discuss
different types of healthcare data and their unique privacy
and security issues to fully grasp the nature of the prob-
lem we currently face in generating, storing, retrieving,
and processing of the healthcare data.
6. State-of-the-art for Security and Privacy in Health-
care Systems
Data access, storage, and analysis are not unique to
healthcare system. Any large volume of data with many
stakeholders with different interests and authorities con-
stitutes similar security and privacy challenges whether
online shopping, financial services, defense secrets or even
public service providers. Any measure introduced to pro-
tect the sensitive data can be applied in all these sectors
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regardless of the nature of the data or institution. It is
an evolutionary process where many security and privacy
measure are already in place, being updated to improve
the security or to counter the newly discovered loopholes.
6.1. Access Control
The most challenging aspect of a large healthcare data
network is the security administration. Healthcare sys-
tem is a complex system with diverse data and the ever-
increasing number of users with different requirements for
types of data as well as durations. There are many access
control models but Mandatory Access control (MAC), Dis-
cretionary Access control (DAC) and Role-Based Access
control (RBAC) are the most popular [57]. MAC model
gives total control to the security policy administrator and
the user has no control or authority to override established
policies. Security policy administrator defines the usage
and resources and their access policy and this policy de-
fines who has access to which files. This model is suitable
where confidentiality is the main concern such as defense
and national security matters. DAC model gives the au-
thority and control to the end users where end users have
full control over the resources they own and owners decide
who can access their resources. Finally, the RBAC model
is based on rights and access to resources according to the
membership to predefined groups. RBAC helps in making
a mechanism where data is accessed on the need to know
basis. It results in less complexity of the system, reduced
cost as well as protection of the sensitive data beyond its
required and necessary disclosure [49].
As mentioned earlier, access control of the resources
and information Big data offers is a key feature of the
overall security and privacy aspects of healthcare. As we
know, healthcare is a dynamic sector where the role is not
defined solely by the profession or position of a user in the
organization but also depends on the situation [57]. In
view of the significance and relevance of the above-defined
access control models in the healthcare sector, MAC is one
of the strictest and most secure. It is a type of access con-
trol model where confidentiality is the main priority and
where all control and authority rest with a central admin-
istration. It suits military and defense sectors better as the
main priority is to protect the assets from unlawful access.
It is static in nature and the design requires a lot of plan-
ning before the implementation. Even after implementa-
tion, it requires a huge system management overhead to
add new objects, add new users, or modify the rights of
existing users. These aspects make this model unsuitable
for the healthcare sector due to its dynamic nature.
DAC model provides the flexibility needed by the health-
care sector as it rests the authority with the users but also
make it more prone to security and privacy risks as users
have full control on the assets they created and a user can
set who can access their data. Again, it is obvious that
risks associated with this model make it unsuitable for the
healthcare data. RBAC is currently most popular mode
of access control in the healthcare sector as it defines the
privileges and rights of a user based on its membership to
a group or groups based on their function in the health-
care sector. From a healthcare point of view, it means
groups like GP, nurses, lab technicians or X-rays techni-
cians. But again, lately, some of the drawbacks of this
model in the healthcare sector have emerged as there is
no way to provide individual users with the rights over
and above the privileges assigned to the group they be-
long to. Since healthcare staff goes through many dif-
ferent situations, their demand for healthcare information
can change abruptly. One of the most important situa-
tions in the healthcare sector is emergency. In the face of
an emergency, the roles of the user and the demand for
data changes.
More recently, Attributes Based access control (ABAC)
found its way into the healthcare sector as it provides the
flexibility needed to handle the situations in the health-
care sector where responsibilities and demand for data
change. ABAC is based on users attributes as well as on
resources, object, and environmental attributes. It works
on the Boolean logic where access to data based on IF and
Then statements [58]. In ABAC, permission to access ob-
jects like files, images, and reports are not simply based on
the subject but depends on the attributes of the subject.
Here subject means any user who is accessing the health-
care data. These attributes are static like name, position
and role and dynamics like role, situation, environment,
and location. Based on edit and entry, healthcare data can
be generalized into two types: Static Data usually stays
the same in the normal scenario and some of the types
are patient personal data like name, sex, blood group, al-
lergies, past medical treatment and records and insurance
information. On the other hand, Dynamics Data, such as
care plan, progress notes, readings of the vital organs, or
medical reports, usually modify, update, or delete on the
regular basis.
In the healthcare system, diversity is found not only in
the data but also in the user and their level of access to the
data. The access depends on other stakeholders consent
and input and it creates a complex web where an entity
has some privileges and do other tasks after getting the
approval from suitable entities within a healthcare system.
To understand the complexity of the system, we analyze
the mechanism of accessing data from a single patient [59]:
Administration has the widest access to the health-
care data compared to other stakeholders and they are
mainly responsible for controlling the types of access for
the other stakeholders. This data includes medical, per-
sonal, and financial information. But again, this access
is restricted. They can add past medical records and can
make medical entries but in the latter case, requires the
consent and approval of a doctor. They are also the only
entity which can authorize to delete medical data but must
abide by the laws on data retention period.
Doctors usually have full access to the medical records
of their patients and can add medical entries and private
notes. Private notes are not visible to the other health
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workers and administration and only shared between doc-
tors and their patients. In case of an emergency or a vis-
iting doctor attending other doctors, the patient gets the
temporary access to the medical record by the consent of
the patient and notification to the administration.
Healthcare workers are required to sign the confi-
dentiality agreement before gaining any access to health-
care data. Normally they have the access to the care plan
and can add progress notes. As far as emergency data is a
concern, crucial data is usually available to all healthcare
workers so they have all the information require to handle
an emergency. It must be noted that they normally have
access to recent medical records and historical records are
usually not available to them but can be obtained by re-
questing administration. Auditing is implemented by hav-
ing a logging mechanism where any unlawful attempt is
recorded and if a pattern is discovered, concerned author-
ity is informed for suitable and preventive action.
Patients have the right to access their own data at
any time which also includes the private notes of doctors.
Of course, this access to be only read as they shouldnt be
allowed to alter the data.
Other users such as volunteer helpers, visiting phys-
iotherapist, social workers, and community service mem-
bers also require some sort of healthcare data that must
be authorized through administration with the time stamp
and in the end with the consent of the patients. It is ob-
vious from the above discussion of different stakeholders
and their requirements for the access to the healthcare
data that RBAC model is most suitable as the roles and
requirements are ever evolving and the mechanism of ac-
cessing healthcare information needs regular reviews and
appropriate amendments [60].
6.2. Encryption
Encryption is used to ensure the security and provides
protection against eavesdropping and skimming. There
are many types of encryption are currently deployed in
the healthcare data, some work on the hardware level and
other work on the software level. For best results, it is nec-
essary to deploy encryption on both software and hardware
levels. Some encryption is based on symmetric key while
other asymmetric key based. Again, as there are many
solutions available for encryption and are being deployed
in the healthcare sector, each has some limitations.
In 2009, IBM developed a homomorphic encryption
technique which allows processing of the data without de-
cryption. It gives a huge boost to the processing time as
well as the preservation of crucial resources. But since it is
based on an algebraic algorithm, a different ciphertext can
be created from a plaintext. Also, homomorphic encryp-
tion is not semantically secure and cannot provides any
means for verification [61]. Another encryption technique
used is attribute-based encryption [62]. This technique
called for an encryption of data before being shared with
others. Basically, the owner of the data has the authority
to encrypt the data and allows which entities will have the
access to the data and more precisely which part of data.
Owner will share the keys for decryption with the selected
entities which later will use these keys to decrypt data.
Owner of data only retains the privilege to revoke or grant
the access.
The main issue with any encryption technique is key
management. Not all users are experienced with keys to
managing their own keys and on the other hand, a central
key authority will be easily overwhelmed by the number
of keys they must manage in the case of the healthcare
sector.
6.3. Authentication
Authentication techniques are used to verify the source
of data to make sure data is coming from the source it
claims to be. There are many authentication techniques
used in the healthcare sector like password and digital sig-
nature but can be seen that the most common form of
authentication method used in the healthcare sector is an
identifier with a password [63]. There is much software
available to retrieve the passwords and users are usually
choose any easier password for convenience. Also, it is
common for the users to expose their passwords through
social engineering and carelessness. One common habit is
to write down the password on a piece of paper and keep
it in an easily accessible place. A better authentication
system is to have a credential system where only those
already possess the legitimate credential can access the
system. In a credential system, a user obtains a credential
from an organization and later display possession. A user
can perform some cryptographic operation on the creden-
tial by digital signing. It is more secure than password as
it cannot be retrieved by guessing.
6.4. Policy development
As mentioned earlier, the healthcare sector is under-
going a revolution and an ever-increasing amount of data
is being generated, share, and store. And mentioned the
complexity of the overall system, where who access what
data is changing over time. A set of fixed policy cur-
rently exists in many healthcare services are inadequate
and a threat to the security and privacy. There is a need
for a dynamic and scalable policy on the data access and
sharing. There must be a mechanism where the rights
of all stakeholders to data need to be revised based on
their needs without compromising the privacy and secu-
rity. Also, there must be an authority who can monitor
and later revise the access to the data with the consent of
the patients. Most importantly, there is a need to bring
awareness about the importance of the personal health-
care information and consequences of any unlawful access
or alteration of data. In the end, it must be obvious that
the mechanism of revising the rights to access type and
extent of data cannot be done manually and an automa-




Data mining is a process of analyzing data to iden-
tify the pattern and to extract information from a large
amount of data and thus present a serious security and
privacy issue. As mentioned earlier, healthcare data is
enormous, heterogeneous and distributed in nature. There
is a need to standardize this data for a better analysis and
extraction of useful information but any effort in this direc-
tion also ensures data exploitation unless proper security
and privacy measures are in place [49]. Data anonymiza-
tion is in place to hide some attributes of a patient like a
name, age, gender, and address. But again, this anonymiza-
tion is not very effective as still any unlawful extraction
and analysis of the data will lead to some sort of pattern
and will provide sensitive information.
Anonymization is a complex phenomenon where anonymiza-
tion is not an issue but later the extraction of the informa-
tion from the anonymized data is a challenge. Due to the
diversity of the healthcare data and different stakehold-
ers demanding access to different part of the whole data,
there arises a question of what level of anonymization is
suitable for all users. It is understood that data need to be
anonymized before it being shared but what information
needed by entities like doctors and insurance companies is
different and similarly the level of data mining capabilities
required to extract information is diverse. Besides, while
ethical practices are well defined for the primary users like
doctors, patients and nurses, there is still a lot of work need
to be done for the vast array of disclosures to secondary
users like insurance companies and health care evaluators
[49].
7. Comparative Analysis of Existing Privacy As-
surance Models for e-Healthcare
Privacy assurance within e-healthcare can be studied
from various dimensions highlighting specific privacy re-
quirements. In this paper, we focus on Electronic Transfer
of Prescription (ETP) and access for emergency services
dimensions to conduct an in-depth study of the challenges
for privacy assurance within e-healthcare in general and
ETP in particular.
7.1. Electronic Transfer of Prescription
Electronic Transfer of Prescription is a generation, trans-
mission, and processing of medical prescription performed
electronically instead of the traditional paper-based sys-
tem. It allows doctors, physicians, and pharmacists to
transmit and share error-free, understandable and accu-
rate prescriptions. A prescription is typically originated
at the doctor office and destined for the pharmacist. ETP
is therefore envisaged to reduce the risks involved in man-
ual paper-based prescriptions which serves as the primary
motivation for its adoption in the healthcare sector. Com-
pared with traditional paper-based approaches for a pre-
scription, ETP has a number of advantages including; im-
proved patient safety and care through error-free sharing
of prescriptions as well as speeding up the process of ex-
ecuting a prescription. Furthermore, ETP also enables
reducing the overall cost by providing access to less ex-
pensive drug alternatives and avoids duplicate prescrip-
tions. Similar to a generic electronic solution, As with
any electronic form, ETP is also susceptible to security
requirements such as those translated into confidentiality,
integrity, and availability.
The UK government has initiated implementation of
ETP in the NHS to handle more than 500 million prescrip-
tions annually and a central Prescription pricing authority
(PPA) has been established for processing all prescriptions
and thus is a central part to any transaction in an ETP
system [64]. With regards to addressing security and pri-
vacy challenges, three ETP models have been considered
which include; 1) Transcript Consortium Model – where a
prescriber generates a prescription, digitally signs it and
generates a barcode. Prescriber also sends an encrypted
electronic prescription to the PPA as per requirement. Pa-
tient than takes the barcode to any pharmacy part of ETA
and pharmacist uses the barcode to validate the digitally
signed prescription and dispensed drug. 2) Pharmacy 2U
Consortium Model – is based on the direct communication
between the prescribers and pharmacies where the patient
is asked for the choice of pharmacy for pick up. GP than
digitally signed the prescription and sends it directly to
the selected pharmacy. A copy of the same prescription
signed by the GP also sent to the PPA. 3) Schlumberg-
erSema Consortium Model – is based on a relay system
called fexiscript as an intermediate data store has intro-
duced between the GPs and pharmacists. GPs dont have
any direct communication with the pharmacists and any
communication from GP to pharmacist must be handled
by a data store an intermediate entity. GP digitally signed
a prescription and encrypt it for the data store and send
it to the intermediate data store.
In addition to these models, Salford Model [29] was
developed to address the shortcomings of the earlier mod-
els. Like Flexiscript, Salford model is a relay based system
which in this case is a prescription store. In a typical sce-
nario, a prescriber generates a prescription, digitally sign
it and symmetrically encrypt and sends it to prescription
store. This message also contains an encrypted symmetric
key for the PPA. It must be noted that in this model there
is no direct communication between GPs and pharmacists
with PPA and only the prescription store has a communi-
cation channel with PPA. The patient is provided a paper
with reference barcode for accessing the prescription and
asymmetric key barcode to decrypt the prescription in the
prescription store. These two barcodes help a pharmacy
to retrieve and decrypt the prescription from the prescrip-
tion store. Pharmacist, upon dispensation of prescription,
sends a dispense message encrypted for PPA to the pre-
scription store. Prescription stored periodically retrieves
information about dispensed and non-dispensed prescrip-
tion from the prescription store. In the case where the pa-
tient has a preferred pharmacy, GP sends an email to the
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chosen pharmacy which again contains reference barcode
and symmetric key barcode and in this case, the prescrip-
tion can be made ready for pick up by the pharmacy prior
to patients arrival at the pharmacy.
7.2. Analysis of existing ETP privacy assurance models
In view of the security and privacy requirements of the
above-defined scenarios, a rigorous analysis of existing pri-
vacy assurance models for confidentiality, availability, and
integrity is paramount. Such comparative analysis is en-
visaged to facilitate enhancements aimed at improving the
state of the art to achieve specific security and privacy re-
quirements. Within this context, a detailed comparison of
different ETP models with a summary of comparison is
presented in Table 1
As is evident from the table, the Salford model at-
tempts to address all security requirements for ETP in-
cluding freedom in choice of pharmacy and non-repudiation.
However, the comparison has also highlighted two limita-
tions in Salford mode i.e.
• Salford model proposes to X.509 & PERMIS to achieve
authorization which is focused at asserting the iden-
tity of the prescription issuing authority. However,
it does not mitigate against malicious attacks such
as masquerading with respect to the use of a pre-
scription.
• The Salford model attempts to address duplication
and fraudulent use of prescription by using encrypted
prescription where a prescription can only be used
once. However, this mechanism is limited in pro-
tection against masquerading and ID theft attacks
where a prescription is misused by an imposter.
The above limitations highlight a gap in existing pri-
vacy assurance models for e-healthcare in general and ETP
in particular. We address these limitations as part of our
enhanced privacy assurance model in the next section.
8. Enhanced Privacy Assurance Model for ETP
In this section we present our reference model for secur-
ing the healthcare data when data is accessed by multiple
medical paractioners.
8.1. Usage Scenario
We are adopting the same usage scenario mentioned
in [65]. A patient, named Gorge, is recently diagnosed
with a gastric cancer. For many patients, chemotherapy
and radiation therapy after stomach surgery increase the
chances of cure. For the treatment and surgery, Gorge
entered a recommended cancer-treatment center. George
also has a general family practitioner whom he regularly
visits for his treatment and medical consultation. Upon
entering the hospital, Gorge also has an attending doctor
from the hospital. On the analysis and during the initial
treatment Georges health condition deteriorate and has
cause some complications that his attending medical par-
actioners doctor would like to have an expert opinion and
consultation for Gorges treatment from different medical
specialist doctors, including Gorges specific general practi-
tioner because he is fully informed about Gorge s medical
history. The invited practitioners are specialized in dif-
ferent subjects and all the involve person requires to have
the medical records for the analysis with the request based
on the HIPAA minimal disclosure principle. Furthermore,
the consultation result, such as the diagnosis and treat-
ment suggestions, should be signed and certified by this
group of specialists and practitioners. The medical certifi-
cate with their signatures is sent to Gorge. If Gorge would
like to share this medical information with her loved ones
and her family physician, he can put the new medical cer-
tificate into her PHR database.
In this setup the paractioners and the Gorge requires pro-
tection of their private data. From the practitioners point
of view he need to know how to securely obtain the med-
ical history of Gorge and how to ensure that the received
history is obtained after the consent of Gorge. This re-
lates to the problem of secure authorization of the medical
reports. Similarly, for patient, Gorge needs to be ensured
the allowed person could only have secure access to his
medical records. Our proposed model ensure the privacy
and security of medical data for both paractioners as well
as patient.
8.2. Proposed Model for ETP
Through the comparison performed in section 7, it is
highlighted that Salford Model satisfies major security re-
quirements for ETP concerning confidentiality, authoriza-
tion, integrity, and availability. However, there are limi-
tations for Salford model specifically with respect to au-
thenticated access to prescription and with respect to data
transmission through barcodes. For instance, although en-
crypted prescriptions address the confidentiality require-
ment, these do not mitigate against scenarios where a pre-
scription is lost by the patient or misused by someone other
than the patient (impersonation and ID theft). Further-
more, the data that can be communicated using barcodes
are limited in type and volume and therefore has seen them
be replaced by QR codes.
Within this context, we present specific enhancements
to the Salford model targeting mitigation against the above
limitations by incorporating multi-factor authentication
and the use of QR codes. The Enhanced Salford Model is
presented in Figure 1. The important features of enhanced
Salford model are as follow:
1. Replacement of Barcode with QR code to improve
customization, storage ability, and error correction.
2. SMS notification to the patient whenever a phar-
macy tries to access prescription from the prescrip-
tion store using QR code and request for the verifi-
cation code. This will achieve multi-factor authenti-
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Transcript Pharmacy2U Flexiscript Salford
Authentication No No No X.509 & PERMS
Encryption No Yes Yes, but data store can decrypt Yes
Confidentiality Yes Yes Weak Yes
Freedom in choice of pharmacy Yes No Yes Yes
Digital signature Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duplicate/fraudulent prescription Weak Weak Weak Weak
Availability Yes No Yes(revert to paper based) Yes
Table 1: Comparison of ETP Models
cation mitigating threats such as masquerading and
ID theft.
3. SMS notification to the patient when PPA try to
access prescription from the prescription store using
QR code and request for the verification code. This
will facilitate multi-factor authentication mitigating
threats such as masquerading and ID theft.
QR code is 2-dimensional barcode consists of black
squares in a grid form on a white background. It can be
read by an imaging device like a camera and processed
using Reed-Solomon error correction until the image is in-
terpreted appropriately. The obvious difference between
QR code and the barcode is the way how they store data.
While barcode stores data vertically, QR code can store
data vertically as well as horizontally. QR code has many
advantages over barcodes. Some of the advantages are as
below:
• QR code is much smaller in size as compare to bar-
code
• QR code can store 100 times more information than
a barcode
• QR code is easier to use and easier to read as it can
be scan over 360 degrees thus eliminating and inter-
ference and negative effects from background code
offers greater error margin as compared to barcode
• QR code can store informations in term of charac-
ters, symbols, text, and control codes
As shown in Fig 1, a patient is asked to select a per-
sonal code when his account is being set up in the health-
care system along with other information like address and
mobile number. When a prescription in the form of a QR
code is handed over to the patient, or scanned by the pa-
tient or sent digitally to the patient by GP, the patient can
take it to a pharmacy of choice. When pharmacist scans
the code to retrieve the prescription, a notification is sent
to the patient’s registered mobile. Patient must authorize
the access by using his personal code set during account
setup. Only upon confirmation by the patient, the phar-
macist can retrieve the prescription from the prescription
store. Later when the transaction is completed, another
is SMS sent to the patient to acknowledge the completion
of the transaction and again the patient must confirm us-
ing personal code. The same procedure will follow when
GP send QR code directly to the pharmacy. The same
process will follow in the case of home delivery whereupon
delivery patient will receive an SMS notification and again
must respond by using his personal code to acknowledge
delivery. This two-factor authorization will ensure addi-
tional security in the model overall as the patient will be
total control of which pharmacy retrieve prescription and
to avoid fraudulent claims. Even when PPA will try to
access a patient prescription, the patient will receive an
SMS notification as demonstrated in Fig 1.
9. Recommendations and open challenges
Proliferation of contemporary and emerging technolo-
gies has defined our lives. From traditional Internet based
systems to emerging smart technologies, technology has
influenced healthcare aiming to achieve benefits such as
real-time monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment from vir-
tually anywhere globally. In this section, we present a
discussion of the recommendations and open challenges to
achieve privacy assurance within smart healthcare.
Security of mobile healthcare platforms Mobile
technologies and the Internet has made it possible to ac-
cess medical data, images, and remote monitoring any-
time anywhere. This phenomenon has transformed the
healthcare sector into a dynamic environment where vir-
tually everything is available anywhere. However, use of
the Internet and mobile technology introduces risks of pri-
vacy, integrity, and confidentiality as a distributed struc-
ture with potentially unlimited users poses a great risk of
making data exposed beyond required limits. A mobile
healthcare system helps improve patient care, quality of
healthcare services, professionalism and productivity and
reduction in cost. It is extremely significant that patients
and healthcare workers have confidence in the confidential-
ity, integrity, and security of the mobile technology for an
effective deployment of the same in the healthcare sector.
Currently, a number of measures are available to address
the privacy and security issues of the mobile technology in
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Figure 1: Enhanced Salford Model
Figure 2: Secure architecture for healthcare database
the healthcare services such as data encryption, database
security, security policies and defining extent of medical
data sharing [30].
Security of mobile devices: Users not only needed
to be authenticated to access the healthcare data from
their mobile devices but additionally, this access should
be from mobile applications and this mobile application
should be designed in such a way to force the users to
have some sort of security features on their mobile devices
like password or biometrics. This way healthcare-related
mobile application would not run on an open mobile device
without any security feature enabled. Multifactor authen-
tication must be enabled to enhance security from creden-
tial theft. Additionally, there should be a two-factor au-
thentication where an attempt to access a medical record
automatically sends a message to the patient mobile de-
vice and only upon approval by the patient, medical record
can be accessed. This way a patient can control the ac-
cess to the medical record as well as becomes aware of any
attempt to access its personal information.
Multi-factor authentication: Multi-factor authen-
tication facilitates protection against masquerading and
ID theft attacks by incorporating additional user input in
the authentication process. Whilst multi-factor authen-
tications, access upon acknowledgment by patients, and
ABAC can be applied to improve the privacy and secu-
rity measures in the healthcare sector, there are still areas
which require further improvement. It is recommended to
use Security Information and Events Management (SIEM)
software to analyze real-time analysis of the security alerts
as well as investigating the source of attacks. Further au-
diting of the database is required to make sure that le-
gitimate users are not exploiting their privileges. Here is
a scenario to analyze the security and privacy issues of
accessing healthcare data using mobile technologies and
their related remedies.
Medium: Since in the case of mobile technologies, the
medium used to transfer information is wireless, anyone
can have access to this information in the air. It is of
utmost importance that strong encryption is in place to
make sure that even in the advent of an unlawful capture
of this information; a hacker would not be able to extract
the sensitive information.
Security of healthcare database: Servers not only
store the data but also make it possible to do data mining
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using analytical tools for understanding the data. Since
database servers are a source of sensitive and confidential
data, it should be secured through authentication [66, 67],
applying privacy enhancing tools (e.g differential privacy,
anonymization) [68, 69] role-based access control [70], se-
curity policies to restrict the access [71] and using blockchain
technology for the healthcare 8327543. A comprehensive
architecture to secure healthcare database is presented in
a Figure 2.
Dynamic security policy The healthcare sector is
dynamic where the role of a user changes with the lo-
cation and situation. For example, a physician requires
access to a patient data in an emergency scenario which
under normal situation is denied. Although RBAC used
intensively in the healthcare sector, it has limitations when
it comes to allowing access to resources based on the loca-
tion, situation, and time considerations. Attribute-based
access control has recently been deployed in the healthcare
sector to address the limitation of the RBAC as accesses
control is not fixed but based on different attributes which
creates an if than scenarios and access is based on fulfilling
certain conditions and access to resources becomes flexible
and scalable. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehen-
sive security policy with clear and well-defined attributes
as well as defining the limits on what data should be avail-
able in a certain situation. This policy should also include
auditing features where any breach of data or attempt for
an unlawful access should be detected and recorded for
appropriate preventive actions.
Standardization of healthcare data: Healthcare
data consists of structured and unstructured data, images,
handwritten notes, and graphs. Since this data shared be-
tween different entities like healthcare centers and insur-
ance companies, there is a need to have a standardized
format so sharing, flow, and understanding of data can be
achieved in a seamless manner achieving integrated oper-
ation across heterogeneous systems.
Patients awareness: Since patients are considered
the primary owner of their healthcare data, it is important
that they must be aware of the risks and benefits of their
confidential information sharing. It is common for a pa-
tient to expose their data to the unrelated person leading
to masquerading and ID theft attacks. Within this con-
text, patient awareness can be raised with respect to risks
and benefits of sharing their personal data. They should
be aware of whom to share the data and up to what extent
and under what conditions.
10. Conclusion
Internet of Things have revolutionized diverse domains
including healthcare with emerging applications to achieve
improved well being and overall quality of life. Context-
awareness and mobility afforded by IoT has a profound
role in this. However, healthcare data is typically sensi-
tive demanding specific measures to achieve in-depth pro-
tection against its misuse. Although the use of smart
devices opens new horizons for emerging smart health-
care paradigm, it also introduces new challenges with re-
spect to the privacy of the data involved and the context-
aware mobility of smart healthcare applications. This pa-
per has therefore focused on privacy preservation within
smart healthcare with a special emphasis on privacy assur-
ance challenges within the Electronic Transfer of Prescrip-
tion (ETP). It mainly emphasized the role of the patient in
any privacy and security measure and the recently enacted
GDPR law has emphasized this further. Based on rigorous
analysis of existing privacy preservation models we pro-
pose an enhancement for the widely used Salford model
to achieve privacy preservation against masquerading and
impersonation threats. We conclude that any security and
privacy measure cannot be effective in the absence of an
effective and scalable security policy. A flexible and auto-
mated security policy to accommodate the ever-changing
environment, roles and responsibilities of the healthcare
workers can assure a secure healthcare system capable of
protecting a patients confidential and sensitive informa-
tion.
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